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Abstract
Given a huge set of applicants, how should a firm allocate sequential resume
screenings, phone interviews, and in-person site visits? In a tiered interview pro-
cess, later stages (e.g., in-person visits) are more informative, but also more ex-
pensive than earlier stages (e.g., resume screenings). Using accepted hiring mod-
els and the concept of structured interviews, a best practice in human resources,
we cast tiered hiring as a combinatorial pure exploration (CPE) problem in the
stochastic multi-armed bandit setting. The goal is to select a subset of arms (in our
case, applicants) with some combinatorial structure. We present new algorithms
in both the probably approximately correct (PAC) and fixed-budget settings that
select a near-optimal cohort with provable guarantees. We show on real data from
one of the largest US-based computer science graduate programs that our algo-
rithms make better hiring decisions or use less budget than the status quo.
‘... nothing we do is more important than hiring and developing people. At the end of the
day, you bet on people, not on strategies.” – Lawrence Bossidy, The CEO as Coach (1995)
1 Introduction
Hiring workers is expensive and lengthy. The average cost-per-hire in the United States is
$4,129 [Society for Human Resource Management, 2016], and with over five million hires per
month on average, total annual hiring cost in the United States tops hundreds of billions of dol-
lars [United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018]. In the past decade, the average length of the
hiring process has doubled to nearly one month [Chamberlain, 2017]. At every stage, firms expend
resources to learn more about each applicant’s true quality, and choose to either cut that applicant or
continue interviewing with the intention of offering employment.
In this paper, we address the problem of a firm hiring a cohort of multiple workers, each with un-
known true utility, over multiple stages of structured interviews. We operate under the assumption
that a firm is willing to spend an increasing amount of resources—e.g., money or time—on appli-
cants as they advance to later stages of interviews. Thus, the firm is motivated to aggressively “pare
down” the applicant pool at every stage, culling low-quality workers so that resources are better
spent in more costly later stages. This concept of tiered hiring can be extended to crowdsourcing
or finding a cohort of trusted workers. At each successive stage, crowdsourced workers are given
harder tasks.
Using techniques from the multi-armed bandit (MAB) and submodular optimization literature, we
present two new algorithms—in the probably approximately correct (PAC) (§3) and fixed-budget
settings (§4)—and prove upper bounds that select a near-optimal cohort in this restricted setting. We
explore those bounds in simulation and show that the restricted setting is not necessary in practice
(§5). Then, using real data from admissions to a large US-based computer science Ph.D. program,
we show that our algorithms yield better hiring decisions at equivalent cost to the status quo—or
comparable hiring decisions at lower cost (§5).
Preprint. Under review.
2 A Formal Model of Tiered Interviewing
In this section, we provide a brief overview of related work, give necessary background for our
model, and then formally define our general multi-stage combinatorialMAB problem. Each of our n
applicants is an arm a in the full set of armsA. Our goal is to selectK < n arms that maximize some
objective w using a maximization oracle. We split up the review/interview process into m stages,
such that each stage i ∈ [m] has per-interview information gain si, cost ji, and number of required
arms Ki (representing the size of the “short list” of applicants who proceed to the next round). We
want to solve this problem using either a confidence constraint (δ, ǫ), or a budget constraint over
each stage (Ti). We rigorously define each of these inputs below.
Multi-armed bandits. The multi-armed bandit problem allows for modeling resource allocation
during sequential decision making. Bubeck et al. [2012] provide a general overview of historic re-
search in this field. In a MAB setting there is a set of n arms A. Each arm a ∈ A has a true
utility u(a) ∈ [0, 1], which is unknown. When an arm a ∈ A is pulled, a reward is pulled from
a distribution with mean u(a) and a σ-sub-Gaussian tail. These pulls give an empirical estimate
uˆ(a) of the underlying utility, and an uncertainty bound rad(a) around the empirical estimate, i.e.,
uˆ(a) − rad(a) < u(a) < uˆ(a) + rad(a) with some probability δ. Once arm a is pulled (e.g, an
application is reviewed or an interview is performed), uˆ(a) and rad(a) are updated.
Top-K and subsets. Traditionally, MAB problems focus on selecting a single best (i.e., highest
utility) arm. Recently, MAB formulations have been proposed that select an optimal subset of K
arms. Bubeck et al. [2013] propose a budgeted algorithm (SAR) that successively accepts and re-
jects arms. We build on work by Chen et al. [2014], which generalizes SAR to a setting with a
combinatorial objective. They also outline a fixed-confidence version of the combinatorial MAB
problem. In the Chen et al. [2014] formulation, the overall goal is to choose an optimal cohortM∗
from a decision class M. In this work, we use decision class MK(A) = {M ⊆ A
∣∣ |M | = K}.
A cohort is optimal if it maximizes a linear objective function w : Rn ×MK(A) → R. Chen et al.
[2014] rely on a maximization oracle, as do we, defined as
OracleK(uˆ, A) = argmax
M∈MK(A)
w(uˆ,M). (1)
Chen et al. [2014] define a gap score for each arm a in the optimal cohortM∗, which is the differ-
ence in combinatorial utility betweenM∗ and the best cohort without arm a. For each arm a not in
the optimal setM∗, the gap score is the difference in combinatorial utility betweenM∗ and the best
set with arm a. Formally, for any arm a ∈ A, the gap score∆a is defined as
∆a =
{
w(M∗)−max{M | M∈MK∧a∈M}w(M), if a /∈M
∗
w(M∗)−max{M | M∈MK∧a/∈M} w(M), if a ∈M
∗.
(2)
Using this gap score we estimate the hardness of a problem as the sum of inverse squared gaps:
H =
∑
a∈A
∆−2a (3)
This helps determine how easy it is to differentiate between arms at the border of accept/reject.
Objectives. Cao et al. [2015] tighten the bounds of Chen et al. [2014] where the objective function
is Top-K, defined as
wTOP(u,M) =
∑
a∈M
u(a). (4)
In this setting the objective is to pick the K arms with the highest utility. Jun et al. [2016] look at
the Top-KMAB problem with batch arm pulls, and Singla et al. [2015a] look at the Top-K problem
from a crowdsourcing point of view.
In this paper, we explore a different type of objective that balances both individual utility and the
diversity of the set of arms returned. Research has shown that a more diverse workforce produces
better products and increases productivity [Desrochers, 2001; Hunt et al., 2015]. Thus, such an ob-
jective is of interest to our application of hiring workers. In the document summarization setting,
Lin and Bilmes [2011] introduced a submodular diversity function where the arms are partitioned
into q disjoint groups P1, · · · , Pq:
wDIV(u,M) =
q∑
i=0
√ ∑
a∈Pi∩M
u(a). (5)
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Nemhauser et al. [1978] prove theoretical bounds for the simple greedy algorithm that selects a set
that maximizes a submodular, monotone function. Krause and Golovin [2014] overview submodu-
lar optimization in general. Singla et al. [2015b] propose an algorithm for maximizing an unknown
function, and Ashkan et al. [2015] introduce a greedy algorithm that optimally solves the problem
of diversification if that diversity function is submodular and monotone. Radlinski et al. [2008]
learn a diverse ranking from behavior patterns of different users by using multiple MAB instances.
Yue and Guestrin [2011] introduce the linear submodular bandits problem to select diverse sets of
content while optimizing for a class of feature-rich submodular utility models. Each of these papers
uses submodularity to promote some notion of diversity. Using this as motivation, we empirically
show that we can hire a diverse cohort of workers (Section 5).
Variable costs. In many real-world settings, there are different ways to gather information, each
of which vary in cost and effectiveness. Ding et al. [2013] looked at a regret minimization MAB
problem in which, when an arm is pulled, a random reward is received and a random cost is taken
from the budget. Xia et al. [2016] extend this work to a batch arm pull setting. Jain et al. [2014] use
MABs with variable rewards and costs to solve a crowdsourcing problem. While we also assume
non-unit costs and rewards, our setting is different than each of these, in that we actively choose how
much to spend on each arm pull.
Interviews allow firms to compare applicants. Structured interviews treat each applicant the same by
following the same questions and scoring strategy, allowing for meaningful cross-applicant compar-
ison. A substantial body of research shows that structured interviews serve as better predictors of
job success and reduce bias across applicants when compared to traditional methods [Harris, 1989;
Posthuma et al., 2002]. As decision-making becomes more data-driven, firms look to demonstrate
a link between hiring criteria and applicant success—and increasingly adopt structured interview
processes [Kent and McCarthy, 2016; Levashina et al., 2014]. Motivated by the structured interview
paradigm, Schumann et al. [2019] introduced a concept of “weak” and “strong” pulls in the Strong
Weak Arm Pull (SWAP) algorithm. SWAP probabilistically chooses to strongly or weakly pull an
arm. Inspired by that work we associate pulls with a cost j ≥ 1 and information gain s ≥ j, where
a pull receives a reward pulled from a distribution with a σ√
s
-sub-Gaussian tail, but incurs cost j.
This type of arm pull is equivalent in information gained to doing a traditional unit cost pull s times
while only costing j. Schumann et al. [2019] only allow for two types of arm pulls and they do not
account for the structure of current tiered hiring frameworks; nevertheless, in Section 5, we extend
(as best we can) their model to our setting and compare as part of our experimental testbed.
Generalizing to multiple stages. This paper, to our knowledge, gives the first computational for-
malization of tiered structured interviewing. We build on hiring models from the behavioral science
literature [Vardarlier et al., 2014; Breaugh and Starke, 2000] in which the hiring process starts at
recruitment and follows several stages, concluding with successful hiring. We model these m suc-
cessive stages as having an increased cost—in-person interviews cost more than phone interviews,
which in turn cost more than simple résumé screenings—but return additional information via the
score given to an applicant. For each stage i ∈ [m] the user defines a cost ji and an information gain
si for the type of pull (type of interview) being used in that stage. During each stage,Ki arms move
on to the next stage (we cut off Ki−1 −Ki arms), where n = K0 > K1 > · · · > Km−1 > Km =
K). The user must therefore define Ki for each i ∈ [m − 1]. The arms chosen to move on to the
next stage are denoted as Am ⊂ Am−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ A1 ⊂ A0 = A.
3 Probably Approximately Correct Hiring
In this section, we present Cutting Arms using a Combinatorial Oracle (CACO), the first of two
multi-stage algorithms for selecting a cohort of arms with provable guarantees. CACO is a probably
approximately correct (PAC) [Haussler and Warmuth, 1993] algorithm that performs interviews over
m stages, for a user-supplied parameterm, before returning a final subset ofK arms.
Algorithm 1 provides pseudocode for CACO. The algorithm requires several user-supplied param-
eters in addition to the standard PAC-style confidence parameters (δ - confidence probability, ǫ -
error), including the total number of stagesm; pairs (si, ji) for each stage i ∈ [m] representing the
information gain si and cost ji associated with each arm pull; the number Ki of arms to remain at
the end of each stage i ∈ [m]; and a maximization oracle. After each stage i is complete, CACO
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removes all butKi arms. The algorithm tracks these “active” arms, denoted by Ai−1 for each stage
i, the total cost Cost that accumulates over time when pulling arms, and per-arm a information such
as empirical utility uˆ(a) and total information gain T (a). For example, if arm a has been pulled once
in stage 1 and twice in stage 2, then T (a) = s1 + 2s2.
Algorithm 1 Cutting Arms using a Combinatorial Oracle
(CACO)
Require: Confidence δ ∈ (0, 1); Error ǫ ∈ (0, 1); Oracle;
number of stagesm; (si, ji,Ki) for each stage i
1: A0 ← A
2: for stage i = 1, . . . ,m do
3: Pull each a ∈ Ai−1 once using the given si, ji pair
4: Update empirical means uˆ
5: Cost ← Cost +Ki−1 · ji
6: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
7: Ai ← OracleKi(uˆ)
8: for a ∈ Ai−1 do
9: rad(a)← σ
√
2 log(4|A|Cost3)/δ
T (a)
10: if a ∈ Ai then u˜(a)← uˆ(a)− rad t(a)
11: else u˜(a)← uˆ(a) + rad(a)
12: A˜i ← OracleKi(u˜)
13: if |w(A˜i)− w(Ai)| < ǫ then break
14: p← argmaxa∈(A˜i\Ai)∪(Ai\A˜i) rad(a)
15: Pull arm p using the given si, ji pair
16: Update uˆ(p) with the observed reward
17: T (p)← T (p) + si
18: Cost ← Cost + ji
19: Out← Am; return Out
CACO begins with all arms active
(line 1). Each stage i starts by pulling
each active arm once using the given
(si, ji) pair to initialize or update em-
pirical utilities (line 3). It then pulls
arms until a confidence level is trig-
gered, removes all but Ki arms, and
continues to the next stage (line 13).
In a stage i, CACO proceeds in
rounds indexed by t. In each round,
the algorithm first finds a set Ai of
size Ki using the maximization ora-
cle and the current empirical means uˆ
(line 7). Then, given a confidence ra-
dius (line 9), it computes pessimistic
estimates u˜(a) of the true utilities of
each arm a and uses the oracle to
find a set of arms A˜i under these pes-
simistic assumptions (lines 10-12). If
those two sets are “close enough” (ǫ
away), CACO proceeds to the next
stage (line 13). Otherwise, across
all arms a in the symmetric differ-
ence between Ai and A˜i, the arm
p with the most uncertainty over its
true utility—determined via rad(a)—
is pulled (line 14). At the end of the last stage m, CACO returns a final set of K active arms that
approximately maximizes an objective function (line 19).
Figure 1: Hardness (H) vs theoretical cost
(T ) as user-specified parameters to the
CACO algorithm change.
We prove a bound on CACO in Theorem 1. As a special
case of this theorem, when only a single stage of interview-
ing is desired, and as ǫ → 0, then Algorithm 1 reduces to
Chen et al. [2014]’s CLUCB, and our bound then reduces
to their upper bound for CLUCB. This bound provides in-
sights into the trade-offs of cost, information gain, problem
hardness, and shortlist size. Given the cost and information
gain parameters Theorem 1 provides a tighter bound than
those for CLUCB.
Theorem 1. Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), any
decision classes Mi ⊆ 2[n] for each stage i ∈ [m], any
linear function w, and any expected rewards u ∈ Rn,
assume that the reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has mean u(a) with a σ-sub-
Gaussian tail. Let M∗i = argmaxM∈Mi denote the optimal set in stage i ∈ [m]. Set radt(a) =
σ
√
2 log(
4Ki−1 Cost3i,t
δ )/Ti,t(a) for all t > 0 and a ∈ [n]. Then, with probability at least 1 − δ, the
CACO algorithm (Algorithm 1) returns the set Out where w(Out)− w(M∗m) < ǫ and
T ≤O
σ2 ∑
i∈[m]
 ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
1
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} log
σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
1
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} .
Theorem 1 gives a bound relative to problem-specific parameters such as the gap scores, inter-stage
cohort sizes Ki, and so on. Figure 1 lends intuition as to how CACO changes with respect to
these inputs, in terms of problem hardness (defined in Eq. 3). When a problem is easy, the min
parts of the bound are dominated by gap scores ∆a, and there is a smooth increase in total cost.
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When the problem gets harder, themins are dominated byK2i /ǫ
2 and the cost is noisy but bounded
below. When ǫ or δ increases, the lower bounds of the noisy section decrease—with the impact
of ǫ dominating that of δ. A policymaker can use these high-level trade-offs to determine hiring
mechanism parameters. For example, assume there are two interview stages. As the number K1 of
applicants who pass the first interview stage increases, so too does total cost T . However, if K1 is
too small (here, very close to the final cohort sizeK), then the cost also increases.
4 Hiring on a Fixed Budget with BRUTAS
Algorithm 2 Budgeted Rounds Updated Targets Successively
(BRUTAS)
Require: Budgets Ti ∀i ∈ [m]; (si, ji, K˜i) for each stage i; con-
strained oracle COracle
1: Define l˜og(n) ,
∑n
i=1
1
i
2: A0,1 ← ∅; B0,1 ← ∅
3: for stage i = 1, . . . ,m do
4: Ai,1←Ai−1,K˜i−1+1; Bi,1←Bi−1,K˜i−1+1; T˜i,0←0
5: for t = 1, . . . , K˜i do
6: T˜i,t ←
⌈
Ti−K˜i
l˜og(K˜i)ji(K˜i−t+1)
⌉
7: foreach a ∈ [n] \ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t) do
8: Pull a (T˜i,t − T˜i,t−1) times; update uˆi,t(a)
9: Mi,t ← COracle(uˆi,t, Ai,t, Bi,t)
10: if Mi,t =⊥ then return ⊥
11: foreach a ∈ [n] \ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t) do
12: if a ∈Mi,t then
13: M˜i,t,a←COracle(wˆi,t, Ai,t, Bi,t∪{a})
14: else
15: M˜i,t,a←COracle(wˆi,t, Ai,t∪{a}, Bi,t)
16: pi,t ← argmax
a∈[n]\(Ai,t∪Bi,t)
w(Mi,t)− w(M˜i,t,a)
17: if pi,t ∈Mt then
18: Ai,t+1 ← Ai,t ∪ {pi,t}; Bi,t+1 ← Bi,t
19: else
20: Ai,t+1 ← Ai,t; Bi,t+1 ← Bi,t ∪ {pi,t}
21: Out← Am,K˜m+1; return Out
In many hiring situations, a
firm or committee has a fixed
budget for hiring (number of
phone interviews, total dollars
to spend on hosting, and so
on). With that in mind, in this
section, we present Budgeted
Rounds Updated Targets Suc-
cessively (BRUTAS), a tiered-
interviewing algorithm in the
fixed-budget setting.
Algorithm 2 provides pseu-
docode for BRUTAS, which
takes as input fixed budgets
Ti for each stage i ∈ [m],
where
∑
i∈[m] Ti = T , the
total budget. In this version
of the tiered-interview prob-
lem, we also know how many
decisions—whether to accept or
reject an arm—we need to make
in each stage. This is slightly
different than in the CACO
setting (§3), where we need to
remove all but Ki arms at the
conclusion of each stage i. We
make this change to align with
the CSAR setting of Chen et al.
[2014], which BRUTAS gen-
eralizes. In this setting, let K˜i
represent how many decisions we need to make at stage i ∈ [m]; thus,∑i∈[m] K˜i = n. The K˜is
are independent of K , the final number of arms we want to accept, except that the total number of
accept decisions across all K˜ must sum toK .
The budgeted setting uses a constrained oracle COracle : Rn × 2[n] × 2[n] →M∪{⊥} defined as
COracle(uˆ, A,B) = argmax
{M∈MK | A⊆M ∧ B∩M=∅}
w(uˆ,M),
where A is the set of arms that have been accepted and B is the set of arms that have been rejected.
In each stage i ∈ [m], BRUTAS starts by collecting the accept and reject sets from the previous
stage. It then proceeds through K˜i rounds, indexed by t, and selects a single arm to place in the
accept set A or the reject set B. In a round t, it first pulls each active arm—arms not in A or B—a
total of T˜i,t− T˜i,t−1 times using the appropriate si and ji values. T˜i,t is set according to Line 6; note
that T˜i,0 = 0. Once all the empirical means for each active arm have been updated, the constrained
oracle is run to find the empirical best set Mi,t (Line 9). For each active arm a, a new pessimistic
set M˜i,t,a is found (Lines 11-15). a is placed in the accept set A if a is not in Mi,t, or in the reject
set B if a is inMi,t. This is done to calculate the gap that arm a creates (Equation 2). The arm pi,t
with the largest gap is selected and placed in the accept set A if pi,t was included inMi,t, or placed
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in the reject set B otherwise (Lines 16-20). Once all rounds are complete, the final accept set A is
returned.
Theorem 2, provides an lower bound on the confidence that BRUTAS returns the optimal set. Note
that if there is only a single stage, then Algorithm 2 reduces to Chen et al. [2014]’s CSAR algorithm,
and our Theorem 2 reduces to their upper bound for CSAR. Again Theorem 2 provides tighter
bounds than those for CSAR given the parameters for information gain sb and arm pull cost jb.
Theorem 2. Given any Tis such that
∑
i∈[m] Ti = T > n, any decision class MK ⊆ 2[n], any
linear function w, and any true expected rewards u ∈ Rn, assume that reward distribution ϕa for
each arm a ∈ [n] has mean u(a) with a σ-sub-Gaussian tail. Let ∆(1), . . . ,∆(n) be a permutation
of ∆1, . . . ,∆n (defined in Eq. 2) such that ∆(1) ≤ . . . ≤ ∆(n). Define H˜ , maxi∈[n] i∆−2(i) . Then,
Algorithm 2 uses at most Ti samples per stage i ∈ [m] and outputs a solution Out ∈ MK ∪ {⊥}
such that
Pr[Out 6= M∗] ≤ n
2 exp
(
−
∑m
b=1 sb(Tb −Kb)/(jb l˜og(Kb))
72σ2H˜
)
(6)
where l˜og(n) ,
∑n
i=1 i
−1, andM∗ = argmaxM∈MK w(M).
When setting the budget for each stage, a policymaker should ensure there is sufficient budget for
the number of arms in each stage i, and for the given exogenous cost values ji associated with
interviewing at that stage. There is also a balance between the number of decisions that must be
made in a given stage i and the ratio siji of interview information gain and cost. Intuitively, giving
higher budget to stages with a higher siji ratio makes sense—but one also would not want to make
all accept/reject decisions in those stages, since more decisions corresponds to lower confidence.
Generally, arms with high gap scores are accepted/rejected in the earlier stages, while arms with low
gap scores are accepted/rejected in the later stages. If the problem is easy (most of the arms have
high gap scores, i.e., many applicants are “clearly” low quality), then a policymaker should allocate
more budget to the earlier stages. If the problem is hard (i.e., comparing applicants is less obvious),
then a policymaker should allocate more budget in the later stages.
Figure 2: Comparison of Cost vs information gain (s) as ǫ increases for CACO. Here, δ = 0.05 and σ = 0.2.
As ǫ increases, the cost of the algorithm also decreases. If the overall cost of the algorithm is low, then increasing
s (while keeping j constant) provides diminishing returns.
5 Experiments
In this section, we experimentally evaluate BRUTAS and CACO in two different settings. The first
setting uses data from a toy problem of Gaussian distributed arms. The second setting uses real
admissions data from one of the largest US-based graduate computer science programs.
5.1 Gaussian Arm Experiments
Figure 3: Hardness (H) vs Cost,
comparing against Theorem 1.
We begin by using simulated data to test the tightness of our theoret-
ical bounds. To do so, we instantiate a cohort of n = 50 arms whose
true utilities, ua, are sampled from a normal distribution. We aim to
select a final cohort of size K = 7. When an arm is pulled during
a stage with cost j and information gain s, the algorithm is charged
a cost of j and a reward is pulled from a distribution with mean ua
and standard deviation of σ/
√
s. For simplicity, we present results
in the setting ofm = 2 stages.
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CACO. To evaluate CACO, we vary δ, ǫ, σ, K1, and s2. We find that as δ increases, both cost
and utility decrease, as expected. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that as ǫ increases, both cost and utility
decrease. Higher values of σ increase the total cost, but do not affect utility. We also find diminishing
returns from high information gain s values (x-axis of Figure 2). This makes sense—as s tends to
infinity, the true utility is returned from a single arm pull. We also notice that if many “easy” arms
(arms with very large gap scores) are allowed in higher stages, total cost rises substantially.
Although the bound defined in Theorem 1 assumes a linear functionw, we empirically tested CACO
using a submodular function wDIV . We find that the cost of running CACO using this submodular
function is significantly lower than the theoretical bound. This suggests that (i) the bound for CACO
can be tightened and (ii) CACO could be run with submodular functions w.
Figure 4: Effect of an increas-
ing budget on the overall utility
of a cohort. As hardness (H) in-
creases, more budget is needed to
produce a high quality cohort.
BRUTAS. To evaluate BRUTAS, we varied σ and (K˜i, Ti) pairs
for two stages. Utility varies as expected from Theorem 2: when σ
increases, utility decreases. There is also a trade-off between K˜i and
Ti values. If the problem is easy, a low budget and a high K˜1 value is
sufficient to get high utility. If the problem is hard (high H value),
a higher overall budget is needed, with more budget spent in the
second stage. Figure 4 shows this escalating relationship between
budget and utility based on problem hardness. Again we found that
BRUTAS performed well when using a submodular function wDIV .
Finally, we compare CACO and BRUTAS to two baseline algo-
rithms: UNIFORM and RANDOM, which uniformly and randomly
respectively, pulls arms in each stage. In both algorithms, the maximization oracle is run after each
stage to determine which arms should move on to the next stage. When given a budget of 2,750,
BRUTAS achieves a utility of 244.0, which outperforms both the UNIFORM and RANDOM baseline
utilities of 178.4 and 138.9, respectively. When CACO is run on the same problem, it finds a solu-
tion (utility of 231.0) that beats both UNIFORM and RANDOM at a roughly equivalent cost of 2,609.
This qualitative behavior exists for other budgets.
5.2 Graduate Admissions Experiment
We evaluate how CACO and BRUTAS might perform in the real world by applying them to a
graduate admissions dataset from one of the largest US-based graduate computer science programs.
These experiments were approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board and did not affect
any admissions decisions for the university. Our dataset consists of three years (2014–16) worth of
graduate applications. For each application we also have graduate committee review scores (normal-
ized to between 0 and 1) and admission decisions.
Experimental setup. Using information from 2014 and 2015, we used a random forest classi-
fier [Pedregosa et al., 2011], trained in the standard way on features extracted from the applications,
to predict probability of acceptance. Features included numerical information such as GPA and
GRE scores, topics from running Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) on faculty recommendation let-
ters [Schmader et al., 2007], and categorical information such as region of origin and undergraduate
school. In the testing phase, the classifier was run on the set of applicantsA from 2016 to produce a
probability of acceptance P (a) for every applicant a ∈ A.
We mimic the university’s application process of two stages: a first review stage where admissions
committee members review the application packet, and a second interview stage where committee
members perform a Skype interview for a select subset of applicants. The committeemembers follow
a structured interview approach. We determined that the time taken for a Skype interview is roughly
6 times as long as a packet review, and therefore we set the cost multiplier for the second stage
j2 = 6. We ran over a variety of s2 values, and we determined σ by looking at the distribution of
review scores from past years. When an arm a ∈ A is pulled with information gain s and cost j, a
reward is randomly pulled from the arm’s review scores (when s1 = 1 and j1 = 1, as in the first
stage), or a reward is pulled from a Gaussian distribution with mean P (a) and a standard deviation
of σ√
s
.
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Figure 5: Utility vs Cost over four different algorithms (RANDOM, UNIFORM, SWAP, CACO, BRUTAS) and
the actual admissions decisions made at the university. Both CACO and BRUTAS produce equivalent cohorts
to the actual admissions process with lower cost, or produce high quality cohorts than the actual admissions
process with equivalent cost.
We ran simulations for BRUTAS, CACO, UNIFORM, and RANDOM. In addition we compare to an
adjusted version of Schumann et al. [2019]’s SWAP. SWAP uses a strong pull policy to probabilis-
tically weak or strong pull arms. In this adjusted version we use a strong pull policy of always weak
pulling arms until some threshold time t and strong pulling for the remainder of the algorithm. Note
that this adjustment moves SWAP away from fixed confidence but not all the way to a budgeted
algorithm like BRUTAS but fits into the tiered structure. For the budgeted algorithms BRUTAS,
UNIFORM, and RANDOM, (as well as the pseudo-budgeted SWAP) if there areKi arms in round i,
the budget isKi · xi where xi ∈ N. We vary δ and ǫ to control CACO’s cost.
We compare the utility of the cohort selected by each of the algorithms to the utility from the cohort
that was actually selected by the university. We maximize either objective wTOP or wDIV for each
of the algorithms. We instantiate wDIV , defined in Equation 5, in two ways: first, with self-reported
gender, and second, with region of origin. Note that since the graduate admissions process is run
entirely by humans, the committee does not explicitly maximize a particular function. Instead, the
committee tries to find a good overall cohort while balancing areas of interest and general diversity.
Results. Figure 5 compares each algorithm to the actual admissions decision process performed
by the real-world committee. In terms of utility, for both wTOP and wDIV , BRUTAS and CACO
achieve similar gains to the actual admissions process (higher for wDIV over region of origin) when
using less cost/budget. When roughly the same amount of budget is used, BRUTAS and CACO
are able to provide higher predicted utility than the true accepted cohort, for both wTOP and wDIV .
As expected, BRUTAS and CACO outperform the baseline algorithms RANDOM, UNIFORM. The
adjusted SWAP algorithm performs poorly in this restricted setting of tiered hiring. By limiting
the strong pull policy of SWAP, only small incremental improvements can be made as Cost is
increased.
6 Conclusions & Discussion of Future Research
We provided a formalization of tiered structured interviewing and presented two algorithms, CACO
in the PAC setting and BRUTAS in the fixed-budget setting, which select a near-optimal cohort of
applicants with provable bounds.We used simulations to quantitatively explore the impact of various
parameters on CACO and BRUTAS and found that behavior aligns with theory. We showed empiri-
cally that both CACO and BRUTAS work well with a submodular function that promotes diversity.
Finally, on a real-world dataset from a large US-based Ph.D. program, we showed that CACO and
BRUTAS identify higher quality cohorts using equivalent budgets, or comparable cohorts using
lower budgets, than the status quo admissions process. Moving forward, we plan to incorporate
multi-dimensional feedback (e.g., with respect to an applicant’s technical, presentation, and analyt-
ical qualities) into our model; recent work due to Katz-Samuels and Scott [2018, 2019] introduces
that feedback (in a single-tiered setting) as a marriage of MAB and constrained optimization, and
we see this as a fruitful model to explore combining with our novel tiered system.
Discussion. The results support the use of BRUTAS and CACO in a practical hiring scenario. Once
policymakers have determined an objective, BRUTAS and CACO could help reduce costs and pro-
duce better cohorts of employees. Yet, we note that although this experiment uses real data, it is still a
simulation. The classifier is not a true predictor of utility of an applicant. Indeed, finding an estimate
of utility for an applicant is a nontrivial task. Additionally, the data that we are using incorporates hu-
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man bias in admission decisions, and reviewer scores [Schmader et al., 2007; Angwin et al., 2016].
Finally, defining an objective function on which to run CACO and BRUTAS is a difficult task.
Recent advances in human value judgment aggregation [Freedman et al., 2018; Noothigattu et al.,
2018] could find use in this decision-making framework.
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A Table of Symbols
In this section, for expository ease and reference, we aggregate all symbols used in the main paper
and give a brief description of their meaning and use. We note that each symbol is also defined
explicitly in the body of the paper; Table 1 is provided as a reference.
B Proofs
In this section, we provide proofs for the theoretical results presented in the main paper. Ap-
pendix B.1 gives proofs for CACO, defined as Algorithm 1 in Section 3. Appendix B.2 gives proofs
for BRUTAS, defined as Algorithm 2 in Section 4.
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B.1 CACO
Theorem 1 requires lemmas from Chen et al. [2014]. We restate the theorem here for clarity and
then proceed with the proof.
Theorem 1. Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), any decision classes Mi ⊆ 2[n] for each stage
i ∈ [m] and any expected rewards u ∈ Rn, assume that the reward distribution ϕa for each arm
a ∈ [n] has mean u(e) with a σ-sub-Gaussian tail. Let M∗i = argmaxM∈M〉 denote the optimal
set in stage i ∈ [m]. Set radt(a) = σ
√
2 log(
4Ki−1 Cost3i,t
δ )/Ti,t(a) for all t > 0 and a ∈ [n].
Then, with probability at least 1 − δ, the CUT algorithm (Algorithm 1) returns the set Out where
Out−M∗m < ǫ and
T ≤O
σ2 ∑
i∈[m]
 ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
1
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
1
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} (7)
Proof. Assume we are in some round i, and that we are at time ta where some arm a is going to
be pulled for the last time in round i. Set rad i,t(a) = σ
√
2 log(4Ki−1 Cost3i,t /delta)
Ti,t(a)
Using Lemma
13 from Chen et al. [2014] we know that rad i,t ≥ max
{
∆a
6 ,
ǫ
2Ki
}
. Before arm a is pulled the
following must be true:
rad i,ta ≥ max
{
∆a
6
,
ǫ
2Ki
}
(8)
rad i,ta = σ
√
2 log(4Ki−1Cost3i,ta /δ)
Ti(a)− si
≤ σ
√
2 log(4Ki−1j3i t3a/δ)
Ti(a)− si . (9)
Equation 9 holds since ji > ji−1 > · · · > j0. Given equations 8 and equation 9 we have,
max
{
∆a
6
,
ǫ
2Ki
}
≤ σ
√
2 log(2Ki−1j3i t3a/δ)
Ti(a)− si
≤ σ
√
2 log(2Ki−1j3i T
3
i /δ)
Ti(a)− si
Solving for Ti(a) we have,
Ti(a) ≤σ2min
{
72
∆2a
,
16K2i
ǫ2
}
log(4Ki−1j3T 3i /δ)
+ si (10)
Note that
Ti(a) ≤ T (a)
ji
si
∑
a∈Ai−1
Ti(a) = Ti. (11)
We will show later on in the proof
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Ti ≤499σ
2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
4σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
+ 2jiKi−1. (12)
Summing up over equation 12 we have
T ≤499σ2
∑
i∈[m]
 ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
4σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} (13)
which proves theorem 1.
Now we will go back to prove equation 12. If Ki−1 ≥ 12Ti, then we see that Ti ≤ 2Ki−1 and
therefore equation 12 holds. Assume, then, thatKi−1 < 12Ti. Since Ti > Ki−1, we can write
T = C
σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
2Ki−1σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} . (14)
If C < 499 then equation 12 holds. Suppose then that C > 499. Using equation 11 and summing
equation 13 for all active arms a ∈ Ai−1, we have
Ti ≤ ji
si
(Ki−1si+
∑
a∈Ai−1
σ2min
{
72
∆2a
,
16K2i
ǫ2
}
log
(
4Ki−1j3i T
3
i
δ
)
≤ Ki−1ji +
18σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} log(4Ki−1j3i T 3i
δ
)
= Ki−1ji +
18σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} log(4Ki−1j3i
δ
)
+
54σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} log(T )
≤ Ki−1ji +
12
18σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} log(4Ki−1j3i
δ
)
+
54σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
2Cσ2j4
siδ
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
4Ki−1σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} (15)
= Ki−1ji +
18σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} log(4Ki−1j3i
δ
)
+
54σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} log(2C)
+
54σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
σ2j4
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
+
54σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log log
4Ki−1σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
≤ Ki−1ji +
18σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
4Ki−1σ2j4
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
+
54σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log(2C) log
4Ki−1σ2j4
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
+
54σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
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log
4Ki−1σ2j4
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
+
54σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
4Ki−1σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
= Ki−1ji +
(126 + 54 log(2C))
σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
4Ki−1σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
≤ Ki−1ji
+C
σ2ji
si
 ∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
}
log
4Ki−1σ2j4i
siδ
∑
a∈Ai−1
min
{
4
∆2a
,
K2i
ǫ2
} (16)
= Ti (17)
where equation 15 follows from equation 14 and the assumption that Ki−1 < 12Ti; equation 16
follows since 136 + 54 log(2C) < C for all C > 499; and 17 is due to 14. Equation 17 is a
contradiction. Therefore C ≤ 499 and we have proved equation 12.
B.2 BRUTAS
In order to prove Theorem 2, we first need a few lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let∆(1), . . . ,∆(n) be a permutation of∆1, . . .∆n (defined in Eq. (2)) such that∆(1) ≤
. . . ≤ ∆(n). Given a stage i ∈ [m], and a pjase t ∈ [Ki], we define random event τi,t as follows
τi,t = {∀i ∈ [n] \ (At ∪Bt) |uˆi,t(a)− u(a)| (18)
<
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Kb−t+1)
6
}
. (19)
Then, we have
τ =Pr
[
m⋂
i=1
Ki⋂
t=1
τi,t
]
≥ 1− n2 exp
(
−
∑m
b=1 sb(Tb −Kb)/(ji l˜og(Kb))
72σ2H
)
. (20)
Proof. In round i at phase t, arm a has been pulled T (a) times. Therefore, by Hoeffding’s inequality,
we have
Pr
[
|uˆi,t(a)− u(a)| ≥
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Kb−t+1)
6
]
14
≤ 2 exp
(
−
Ti,t(a)∆
2
(n−∑i−1
b=0
Kb−t+1)
72σ2
)
(21)
By using the definition of T˜i, t, the quantity T˜i,t∆
2
(n−∑Ki−1
b=1
Kb−t+1)
on the right-hand side of Eq. 21
can be further bounded by
Ti,t∆(n−∑Ki−1
b=1
Kb−t+1)
= (siT˜i,t +
i−1∑
b=1
sbT˜b,Kb+1)∆
2
(n−∑Ki−1
b=1
Kb−t+1)
≥
(
si(Ti,t −Ki)
ji l˜og(Ki)(Ki − t+ 1)
+
i−1∑
b=0
sb(Tb,Kb+1 −Kb)
jb l˜og(Kb)(Kb −Kb + 2)
)
∆2
(n−∑i−1
b=1
Kb−t+1)
≥
i∑
b=1
sb(Tb −Kb)
jb l˜og(Kb)H
,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of H = maxi∈[n] i∆
−2
(i) . By plugging the last
inequality into Eq. 21, we have
Pr
[
|uˆi,t(a)− u(a)| ≥
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Kb−t+1)
6
]
≤ 2 exp
−∑ib=1
(
sb(Tb −Kb)/(jb l˜og(Kb)
)
72σ2H
 (22)
Now, using Eq. 22 and a union bound for all i ∈ [m], all t ∈ [Ki], and all a ∈ [n] \ (At,i ∪Bt,i), we
have
Pr
[
m⋂
i=1
Ki⋂
t=1
τi,t
]
≥ 1− 2
m∑
i=1
Ki∑
t=1
(n−
i−1∑
b=0
Kb − t+ 1)
exp
−∑ib=1
(
sb(Tb −Kb)/(jbb l˜og(Kb))
)
72σ2H

≥ 1− n2 exp
(
−
∑m
b=1 sb(Tb −Kb)/(ji l˜og(Ki))
72σ2H
)
.
Lemma 2. Fix a stage i ∈ [m], and a phase t ∈ [Ki], suppose that random event τi,t occurs. For
any vector a ∈ Rn, suppose that supp(a) ∩ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t = ∅, where supp(a) , {i|a(i) 6= 0} is the
support of vector a. Then, we have
|〈u˜i,t, a〉 − 〈ui,t, a〉| <
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1)
6
‖a‖1
Proof. Suppose that τi,t occurs. Then, we have
|〈u˜i,t, a〉 − 〈ui,t, a〉| (23)
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= |〈u˜i,t −w, a|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
b=1
(u˜t,i(b)− u(b))a(b)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
b∈[n]\(Ai,t∪Bi,t)
(u˜i,t(b)− u(b)) a(b)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (24)
≤
∑
b∈[n]\(Ai,t∪Bi,t)
|(u˜i,t(b)− u(b)) a(b)|
≤
∑
b∈[n]\(Ai,t∪Bi,t)
|u˜i,t(b)− u(i)||a(i)|
<
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1)
6
∑
b∈[n]\(Ai,t∪Bi,t)
|a(b)| (25)
=
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1)
6
‖a‖1 (26)
where Eq. 24 follows from the assumption that a is supported on [n] \ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t); Eq. 25 follows
from the definition of τi,t (Eq. 18).
Lemma 3. Fix a stage i ∈ [m], and a phase t ∈ [Ki]. Suppose that Ai,t ⊆M∗ and Bi,t ∩M∗ = ∅.
LetM be a set such thatAi,t ⊆M andBi,t∩M = ∅. Let a and b be two sets satisfying a ⊆M \M∗,
b ⊆M∗ \M , and a ∩ b = ∅. Then, we have
Ai,t ⊆ (M \ a ∪ b)
and
Bi,t ∩ (M \ a ∪ b) = ∅
and
(a ∪ b) ∩ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t) = ∅.
Lemma 3 is due to Chen et al. [2014].
Lemma 4. Fix any stage i ∈ [m], and any phase t ∈ [Ki] such that
∑i−1
b=0Ki+ t > 0. Suppose that
event τi,t occurs. Also assume that Ai,t ⊆M∗ and Bi,t ∩M∗ = ∅. Let a ∈ [n] \ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t) be an
active arm such that∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1) ≤ ∆a. Them, we have
u˜i,t(Mi,t)− u˜i,t(M˜i,t,a) > 2
3
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1)
Lemma 4 is due to Chen et al. [2014].
Lemma 5. Fix any stage i ∈ [m], and any phade t ∈ [Ki] such that
∑i−1
b=0Ki + t > 0. Suppose
that event τi,t occurs. Also assume that Ai,t ⊆ M∗ and Bi,t ∩M∗ = ∅. Suppose an active arm
a ∈ [n] \ (Ai,t ∩Bi,t) satisfies that a ∈ (M∗ ∩ ¬Mi,t) ∪ (6= M∗ ∩Mi,t). Then, we have
u˜i,t(Mi,t)− u˜i,t(M˜i,t,a) ≤ 1
3
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1)
Lemma 5 is due to Chen et al. [2014].
Now we can prove Theorem 2, restated below for clarity.
Theorem 2. Given any Ti’s where
∑
i∈[m] Ti = T > n, any decision class M ⊆ 2[n], and any
expected rewards u ∈ Rn. Assume that reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has mean
u(e) with a σ-sub-Gaussian tail. Let ∆(1), . . . ,∆(n) be a permutation of∆1, . . .∆n (defined in Eq.
2) such that ∆(1) ≤ . . . ≤ ∆(n). Define H , maxi∈[n] i∆−2(i) . Then, algorithm 2 uses at most Ti
samples per stage i ∈ [m] and outputs a solution Out ∈M∪ {⊥} such that
Pr[Out 6= M∗] ≤ n2 exp
(
−
∑m
b=1 sb(Tb −Kb)/(ji l˜og(Ki))
72σ2H
)
(27)
where l˜og(n) ,
∑n
i=1 i
−1,M∗ = argmaxM∈M w(M).
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Proof. First we show that the algorithm takes at most Ti samples in every stage i ∈ [m]. It is easy to
see that exactly one arm is pulled for T˜i, 1 times in stage i, one arm is pulled for T˜i, 2 times in stage
i, . . ., and one arm is pulled for T˜i,Ki − 1 times in stage i. Therefore, the total number of samples
used by the algorithm in stage i ∈ [m] is bounded by
ji
Ki∑
t=1
T˜i, t ≤ ji
Ki∑
t=1
(
Ti −Ki
l˜og(Ki)ji(Ki − t+ 1)
+ 1
)
=
(Ti −Ki)ji
l˜og(Ki)ji
l˜og(Ki) +Ki
= Ti.
By Lemma 1, we know that the event τ occurs with probability at least 1 −
n2 exp
(
−
∑
m
b=1
sb(Tb−Kb)/(ji l˜og(Ki))
72σ2H
)
. Therefore, we only need to prove that, under event τ ,
the algorithm outputsM∗. Assume that the event τ occurs in the rest of the proof.
We will use induction. Fix a stage i ∈ [m] and phase t ∈ [Ki]. Suppose that the algorithm does not
make any error before stage i and phase t, i.e. Ai,t ⊆ M∗ and Bi,t ∩M∗ = ∅. We will show that
the algorithm does not err at stage i, phase t.
At the beginning of phase t in stage i there are exactly
∑i−1
b=0Ki+ t−1 inactive arms |Ai,t∪Bi,t| =∑i−1
b=0Ki + t − 1. Therefore there must exist an active arm ei,t ∈ [n] \ (Ai,t ∪ Bi,t) such that
∆ei,t ≥ ∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1). Hence, by Lemma 4, we have
w˜i,t(Mi, t)− w˜i,t(Mi,t,ei,t) ≥
2
3
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1). (28)
Notice that the algorithm makes an error in phase t in stage i if and only if it accepts an arm
pi,t /∈ M∗ or rejects an arm pi,t ∈ M∗. On the other hand, arm pi,t is accepted when pi,t ∈ Mi,t
and is rejected when pi,t /∈Mi,t. Therefore, the algorithm makes an error in phase t in stage i if and
only if pt ∈ (M∗ ∩ ¬Mi,t) ∪ (¬M∗ ∩Mi,t).
Suppose that pt ∈ (M∗ ∩ ¬Mi,t) ∪ (¬M∗ ∩Mi,t). Using Lemma 5, we see that
w˜i,t(Mi,t)− w˜i,t(M˜i,t,pi,t) ≤
1
3
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1). (29)
By combining Eq. 28 and Eq. 29, we see that
w˜i,t(Mi,t)− w˜i,t(M˜i,t,pi,t) (30)
≤ 1
3
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1) (31)
<
2
3
∆(n−∑i−1
b=0
Ki−t+1) (32)
≤ w˜i,t(Mi,t)− w˜i,t(M˜i,t,ei,t) (33)
However, Eq. 30 is contradictory to the definition of pi,t , argmaxe∈[n]\(Ai,t∪Bi,t) w˜i,t(Mi,t) −
w˜i,t(Mi,t,e). This proves that pt /∈ (M∗ ∩ ¬Mi,t) ∪ (¬M∗ ∩Mi,t). This means that the algorithm
does not err at phase t in stage i, or equivalentlyAi,t+1 ⊆M∗ and Bi,t+1 ∩M∗ = ∅.
Hence we have Am,Km+1 ⊆ M∗ and Bm,Km+1 ⊆ ¬M∗ in the final phase of the final stage.
Notice that |Am,Km+1| + |Bm,Km+1| = n and Am,Km+1 ∩ Bm,Km+1 = ∅. This means that
Am,Km+1 = M∗ and Bm,Km+1 = ¬M∗. Therefore the algorithm outputs Out = Am,Km+1 = M∗
after phaseKm in stagem.
C Experimental Setup
The machines used for the experiments had 32GB RAM, 8 Intel SandyBridge CPU cores, and were
initialized with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.3. A single run of SWAP over the graduate admissions
data takes about 1 minute depending on the parameters.
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Figure 6: Comparison of Cost over information gain (s) as σ increases for CACO. Here, δ = 0.05 and
ǫ = 0.05.
D Additional Experimental Results
In this section, we present additional experimental results for CACO and BRUTAS. Table 3 sup-
ports the Gaussian simulation experiments of Section 5.1, spcefically, the comparison of CACO and
BRUTAS to two baseline pulling strategies.
Table 4 also supports the Gaussian simulation experiments from Section 5.1. Here, we vary δ instead
of ǫ, as was done in Figure 2 of the main paper. As expected, when δ increases, the cost decreases.
However, the magnitude of the effect is smaller than the effect from decreasing ǫ or varying K1.
This is also expected, as discussed in the final paragraphs of Section 3, and shown in Figure 1.
Figure 6 shows that, as the standard deviation σ of the Gaussian distribution from which rewards
are drawn increases, so too does the total cost of running CACO. The qualitative behavior shown
in, e.g., Figure 2 of the main paper remains: as information gain s increases, overall cost decreases;
as s increases substantially, we see a saturation effect; and, as final cohort size K increases, overall
cost increses.
Figure 7 shows the behavior of CACO for different arm initializations, representing different utilities
and groupings. We chose 4 representative initializations. For most initializations, when K1 = 10,
higher values of s2 do not result in gains. This is because with K1 = 10 and K = 7, there are
only 3 decisions to make on which arms to cut and the information gain from the initial pull of all
arms in stage 2 grants enough information, thus no additional pulls need to be made and cost is uni-
form across s2. However, if the problem of selecting from the short list is hard enough, additional
resources must be spent to narrow the decisions down, as in the top left graph, where total costs de-
crease as s2 increases forK1 = 10 because additional pulls need to be made after the initial pulls of
remaining arms in stage 2. This reflects real life well: usually, the short list can be cut down with one
additional round of (more informative) interviews. However, in rare situations, some candidates are
so close to each other that additional assessments need to be made about them. Another interesting
result is thatK1 = 10 is not always the most cost effective option. If many of the initial candidates
are close together in utility, it will be hard to narrow it down to a final 10 based on resume review
alone: more candidates should be allowed to move onto the next round which has higher information
gain. This can be seen in the bottom right graph.
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Figure 7: Comparison of Cost over information gain (s) for different sets of arms for CACO. Here, δ = 0.075,
ǫ = 0.05, σ = 0.2.
E Limitations
This experiment uses real data but is still a simulation. The classifier is not a true predictor of utility
of an applicant. Indeed, finding an estimate of utility for an applicant is a nontrivial task. Addition-
ally, the data that we are using incorporates human bias in admission decisions, and reviewer scores.
This means that the classifier—and therefore the algorithms—may produce a biased cohort. Train-
ing a human committee or using quantitative methods to (attempt to) mitigate the impact of human
bias in review scoring is important future work. Similarly, CACO and BRUTAS require an objec-
tive function to run; recent advances in human value judgment aggregation [Freedman et al., 2018;
Noothigattu et al., 2018] could find use in this decision-making framework. Additionally, although
we were able to empirically show that both CACO and BRUTAS perform well using a submodular
function wDIV , there are no theoretical guarantees for submodular functions.
F Structured Interviews for Graduate Admissions
The goal of the interview is to help judge whether the applicant should be granted admission. The
interviewer asks questions to provide insight into the applicant’s academic capabilities, research
experience, perseverance, communication skills, and leadership abilities, among others.
Some example questions include:
• Describe a time when you have faced a difficult academic challenge or hurdle that you
successfully navigated. What was the challenge and how did you handle it?
• What research experience have you had? What problem did you work on? What was most
challenging? What did you learn most from the experience?
• Have you had any experiences where you were playing a leadership or mentoring role for
others?
• What are your goals for graduate school? What do you want to do when you graduate?
• What concerns do you have about the program? What will your biggest challenge be? Is
there anything else we should discuss?
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The interviewer fills out an answer and score sheet during the interview. Each interviewer follows the
same questions and is provided with the same answer and score sheet. This allows for consistency
across interviews.
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Symbol Summary
n Number of applicants/arms
A Set of all arms (e.g., the set of all applicants)
a An arm in A (e.g., an individual applicant)
K Size of the required cohort
MK(A) Decisions class or set of possible cohorts of size
K
u(a) True utility of arm a where u(a) ∈ [0, 1]
uˆ(a) Empirical estimate of the utility of arm a
rad(a) Uncertainty bound around the empirical estimate
of the utility uˆ(a) of arm a
w Submodular and monotone objective function for
a cohort where w : Rn ×MK(A)→ R
Oracle Maximization oracle defined in Equation 1 and
used by CACO
COracle Constrained maximization oracle used by BRU-
TAS
M∗ Optimal cohort given the true utilities
∆a The gap score of arm a defined in Equation 2
H The hardness of a problem defined in Equation 3
ji Cost of an arm pull at stage i
si Information gain of an arm pull at stage i
m Number of pulling stages (or interview stages)
Ki Number of arms moving onto the next stage (stage
i+ 1)
Ai The active arms that move onto the next stage
(stage i+ 1)
T (a) Total information gain for arm a
u˜(a) Worst case estimate of utility of arm a
A˜i Best cohort chosen by using the worst case esti-
mates of utility
ǫ We want to return a cohort with total utility
bounded by w(M∗)− ǫ for Algorithm 1
δ The probability that we are within ǫ of the best
cohort for Algorithm 1
Ti Budget constraint for round i
T Total budget
σ Property of the σ-sub-Gaussian tailed normal dis-
tribution
p The arm with the greatest uncertainty in CACO
K˜i Number of decisions to make in round i
T˜i,t Budget for BRUTAS in stage i, round t
Mi,t Best cohort chosen in BRUTAS stage i, round t,
using empirical utilities
M˜i,t,a Pessimistic estimate in BRUTAS stage i, round t,
for arm a
pi,t Arm which results in largest gap in BRUTAS
stage i, round t
H˜ Hardness for BRUTAS
P (a) Probability of acceptance for an arm (candidate),
estimated by Random Forest Classifier
q Number of groups for submodular diversity func-
tion
P1, P2, . . . , Pq The groups for submodular diversity function
Table 1: List of symbols used in the main paper.
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Parameter Range
δ 0.3,0.2,0.1,0.075,0.05
ǫ 0.3,0.2,0.1,0.075,0.05
σ 0.1,0.2
j 6
s 7, . . . , 20
Table 2: Parameters for graduate admissions experiments
Algorithm Cost Utility
Random 2750 138.9 (5.1)
Uniform 2750 178.4 (0.2)
CACO 2609 231.0 (0.1)
BRUTAS 2750 244.0 (0.1)
Table 3: Comparing CACO and BRUTAS to the baseline of Uniform and Random
δ Cost
K1 = 10 K1 = 13 K1 = 18 K1 = 29
0.050 552.475 605.250 839.525 1062.725
0.075 542.425 582.675 827.025 1040.700
0.100 537.175 587.900 820.575 1078.975
0.200 503.650 568.300 801.525 1012.550
Table 4: Cost for CACO over various δ, for ǫ = 0.05, σ = 0.20, s2 = 7
Experiment Cost wTOP wDIV wDIV
over Gender over Region of Origin
Actual – ~2,000 60.9 10.1 17.9
RANDOM
lower 1,359 40.2 (0.3) 9.7 (0.2) 16.9 (0.3)
~equivalent 2,277 43.6 (0.5) 9.9 (0.1) 17.2 (0.2)
higher 11,556 72.9 (4.9) 11.5 (0.1) 18.1 (3.5)
UNIFORM
lower 1,359 49.7 (0.3) 9.8 (0.1) 17.7 (0.1)
~equivalent 2,277 54.7 (0.3) 9.9 (0.2) 18.3 (0.4)
higher 11,556 79.5 (3.2) 11.9 (0.3) 19.6 (0.6)
SWAP
lower 1,400 1,500 58.7 (0.5) 10.1 (0.1) 19.0 (0.1)
~equivalent 1,900–2,000 60.2 (0.4) 10.5 (0.1) 19.1 (0.1)
higher 2,500–2,700 61.5 (0.5) 10.8 (0.2) 19.3 (0.1)
CACO
lower 1,400–1,460 61.1 (0.1) 10.1 (0.2) 18.9 (0.1)
~equivalent 1,950–1,990 78.7 (0.2) 10.7 (0.1) 19.4 (0.2)
higher 2,500–2,700 80.1 (0.4) 12.0 (0.3) 19.8 (0.3)
BRUTAS
lower 1,649 61.2 (0.2) 10.6 (0.1) 19.1 (0.2)
~equivalent 2,038 79.3 (0.3) 10.7 (0.1) 19.8 (0.3)
higher 2,510 80.2 (0.3) 12.0 (0.2) 19.9 (0.2)
Table 5: Utility vs Cost over five different algorithms (RANDOM, UNIFORM, SWAP, CACO, BRUTAS) and
the actual admissions decisions made at our university. (Since CACO is a probabilistic method, the cost is
given over a range of values.) For each of the algorithms, we give results assuming a cost/budget lower, roughly
equivalent, and higher than that used by the real admissions committee. Both CACO and BRUTAS produce
equivalent cohorts to the actual admissions process with lower cost, or produce high quality cohorts than the ac-
tual admissions process with equivalent cost. Our extension of SWAP to this multi-tiered setting also performs
well relative to RANDOM and UNIFORM, but performs worse than both CACO and BRUTAS across the board.
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